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So in reality, attackers stand to gain nothing ﬁnancially by
forging a clear message. Then again, a given attacker either
might not know this, or might have some unusual motivation
(for example, to undermine the credibility of the banks under-
writing the Mondex system) for making his quarry lose funds
by turning the recoverably lost into the irrecoverably lost.
It is in the context of the above that we validate the C
to D retrenchment. The main objective is to estimate how
much greater the chance of inappropriately wiping the log
is, when a hash function is used compared to when a truly
injective one is used. We can do this under two broad classes
of assumptions: ﬁrstly, that any inappropriate clear message
received, arrived by chance; secondly, that any such message
is the result of malicious attack. A third possibility, that the
archive itself sends a clear message at an inappropriate time,
can be discounted: the archive is a critical system component,
and the security of the system as a whole can only be
established on the assumption that the critical components do
not deliberately misbehave.
In the ﬁrst case (pure chance), all message bits can be
assumed to be random variables. In the second case (mali-
cious attack), only the hash value itself might be assumed
cryptographically protected, and the rest of the message could
be constructed by a knowledgeable attacker. Therefore in the
worst case, only the hash itself offers any protection against
inappropriate use, and thus to offer a useful level of protection,
one would assume that at least 256 bits of hash value would
be used. That many bits of hash would offer a good degree
of protection against an attack based on random trials, since
at one trial per millisecond, exhausting all the possibilities
would take many orders of magnitude longer than the age
of the universe. Obviously though, an attacker with some
inside knowledge of the hash algorithm could conceivably do
quite a bit better than chance, depending on the depth of his
knowledge. So, in reality, an even greater number of bits could
easily be used, for the sake of robustness, and as insurance
against future advances in cryptanalysis.
As well as the purely statistical argument just outlined,
a proper validation of the hash function approach ought to
take the physical context into account. Unless an attacker
has built a bespoke environment for the purse in order to
assault it (and the banks underwriting the Mondex system
might well consider it worthwhile to make the Mondex design
robust against such a possible if unlikely attack, if only
to protect their credibility, as indicated above), then clear
messages will usually be issued only in the surroundings of
the bank, when an honest reconciliation of failed transactions
is being attempted. Under such circumstances, not only is the
possibility of malicious attack much reduced, but the purse
will be connected to the archive by a highly reliable commu-
nications link, reducing to vanishingly small, the likelihood
of chance errors arising through transmission.5 This strongly
reinforces the argument that the design using a hash instead of
a genuinely injective clear function is adequately dependable,
5Given the ﬁgures already cited above, we omit any quantative estimates.
and the retrenchment that describes the passage from the ideal
design to the more realistic one is therefore vindicated.
VII. FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS
The reasoning of the previous section prompts further re-
evaluation of the Mondex system as a whole. Consider the
other ‘retrenchment opportunities’ noted in Section II, namely
the sequence number limit, the log size limit, and the balance
enquiry. Although the reader will largely have to take our
word for it due to lack of space, it is the case that in all of
these scenarios, the difﬁculties addressed could arise via the
‘natural’ running of the Mondex protocol as it was originally
intended to function. Thus one could conceive of hitting the
sequence number limit if enough transactions were to take
place; or (even more easily) that the log size limit would
be reached if enough failing transactions were to happen; or
that a transaction of the protocol which was long-lived due to
communication latency, could, if a balance enquiry operation
was called in the middle of it by an impatient recipient, yield
a balance that was out of step with what the abstract A model
would predict at such a moment.
The retrenchment opportunity opened up by the use of a
hash rather than an injective function is of a different nature,
since clearing the log in the intended way only takes place
when it is safe to do so. It is only if the capabilities of the
purse are exploited in a non-intended way that the problem
comes to light. Furthermore, to the extent that the problem
discussed is a real one, then there are repercussions to be
considered for the rest of the Mondex system as follows.
Suppose the probability that the protection offered by the
hash in the clear log case could be broken is indeed nonzero.
This would arise because the environment would be capable
of inventing the right message by some means. However
if the environment were capable of inventing that particular
message, then there is no reason to suppose that it could not
invent other cryptographically protected messages on which
the security of the Mondex system relies. Thus the problem
opened up by a putative weakness in the clear log case spreads
to the whole protocol since there is no reason to suppose
that signiﬁcantly different protection mechanisms would be
implemented, within the restricted code area available on
a smartcard, for different parts of the Mondex system (the
true details of the Mondex system’s cryptographic protection
mechanisms are not in the public domain).
Consider the Mondex protocol, the essentials of which are
illustrated in Fig. 2 for the case of two purses. A successful
run of the protocol requires the successful exchange of three
messages, each of which is security critical. If the possibility
of breaking the cryptographicprotection mechanisms is indeed
nonzero, then one would be able to break not only the integrity
of log clearing, and thence the ‘All value accounted’ security
property, but also the more fundamental ‘No value created’
security property, via a sequence of events as follows.
The scenario consists of one purse, the recipient, or ‘To’
purse, and a suitable harness in which to put it, and within
which its operations may be called. The harness takes over the